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Abstract—Safety cases are increasingly being required in many
safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumenta-
tion and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However,
comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable
challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly
due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as
the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing,
formal veriﬁcation, and other engineering activities. Previously,
we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the
comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper,
we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use
of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases
satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a
formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we
believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted
similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To
this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key
operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives
the speciﬁcation for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our
toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the
theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from
a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.
Index Terms—Abstraction, Hierarchy, Safety assurance, Safety
cases, Tool support
I. INTRODUCTION
The development and acceptance of a safety case is not
only a key element of safety regulation in many safety-critical
sectors [1], such as nuclear, defence, transportation, and oil
& gas, but also increasingly becoming an accepted safety
certiﬁcation practice. Safety (or, more generally, assurance)
cases are structured arguments supported by a body of ev-
idence, providing a convincing and valid justiﬁcation that a
system meets its (safety) assurance requirements, for a given
application in a given operating environment. Safety cases can
be documented in a variety of ways, e.g., a combination of
text descriptions and diagrams. Graphical notations, such as
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [2], have emerged over
the past decade providing a graphical syntax to document the
argument structure embodying a safety case1. However, these
structures are semi-formal and, per se, not checked by any
formal system. Rather, they are designed, in part, to provide
a degree of structure to ameliorate safety case comprehension
and inspection.
Currently, safety cases are largely manually created often
using common argumentation patterns, similar to those found
1We will use argument structure and safety case interchangeably in this
paper; however, a safety case is the argument structure together with all the
documents to which it refers.
in software engineering. In general, understanding, developing,
evaluating, and maintaining safety cases remains a challenge
due to the volume and diversity of information that a typical
system safety case must aggregate when best engineering
practice is followed, e.g., the mandated work products which
show compliance to the relevant regulations and standards,
the results of (safety, system, and software) analyses, various
inspections, audits, reviews, simulations, veriﬁcation activities
including various kinds of subsystem/system tests, formal
veriﬁcation, and, if applicable, also the evidence of safe
performance from prior operations. As an anecdotal example,
the size of the preliminary safety case for surveillance on
airport surfaces [3] is about 200 pages, and is expected to
grow as the interim and operational safety cases are created.
As a safety case evolves and lower-level details are added
during reﬁnement, the natural high-level structure that patterns
offer can be obscured, making comprehension difﬁcult. For
example, to develop a claim of correctness of some safety-
relevant function, say, we can iteratively argue correctness
by formalizing the claim, through iterative property decom-
position, and formal veriﬁcation [4]. However, for such an
argument, the relevance of a very low-level claim to the wider
context of system safety may be difﬁcult to gauge if the claim
exists deep within the natural system hierarchy.
These observations, and our own prior experience [5],
suggest a need for abstraction and structuring mechanisms in
creating and managing a safety case. Additionally, since safety
cases are intended to be a basis for various decisions (e.g.,
whether or not a system is acceptably safe, should additional
evidence be required to accept a claim, whether or not an
argument is fallacious, etc.) we (and others [6]) believe that
there is also a need for a theoretical foundation: both for the
basic concepts of a safety case, and for more advanced notions,
such as hierarchy and its (automated) creation. The broad goal
is to make safety cases amenable to formal analysis, thereby
providing greater assurance.
Our work is further motivated by the need to provide tool
support that also has a formal basis: our assurance case tool,
AdvoCATE [7], can assist in and, to an extent automate,
safety case construction from artefacts such as requirements
tables [8], safety case patterns [9], and external veriﬁcation
tools [10]. Such generated arguments have inherent structure
that can be exploited by hierarchisation. However, the formal
speciﬁcation against which it can be veriﬁed that AdvoCATE
operations (including those relevant for hierarchy) are well-
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Fig. 1. Flat safety argument fragment, extracted from the safety case for a ground-based detect and avoid capability for UAS operations [14].
behaved, has lagged implementation, thus presenting a source
of assurance deﬁcits insofar as the arguments developed using
tool-based automation are concerned. The work in this paper
attempts to close that gap speciﬁcally with respect to hierarchi-
cal safety cases. The inspiration for our work comes from ideas
from formal proof, where hierarchy can be added to proof
trees [11]. We believe that a formal foundation will provide the
requisite framework for independently and rigorously assuring
that the hicases created using tool-supported automation are
well-founded.
Previously [12], [13] we have proposed hierarchical safety
cases, hicases, to aid comprehension of safety case argument
structures through structured abstraction. In this paper, we use
a running example, i.e., a fragment of an argument structure
extracted from a real aviation system safety case [14], to show
how hierarchical structuring can be introduced for abstraction
(Section II, and Fig. 1). We use these modiﬁcations to motivate
our formal deﬁnition of hicases, give the properties for well-
formedness, and formalise the operations relevant for our
implementation (Section III). In particular, our paper makes
the following contributions: (i) a clear and abstract deﬁnition
of the core concepts of the GSN standard [2] and a formal
deﬁnition of the extension to hierarchical safety cases; (ii) an
investigation of hicase properties: that hicases unfold to a non-
hierarchical skeleton, that the hierarchical node types are mu-
tually exclusive, and that (ﬂat) safety cases can be embedded
in a hicase; and, (iii) formal deﬁnitions and correctness proofs
of key operations of hicases: a deﬁnition of views through the
hierarchy, and the syntactic criteria governing when a frag-
ment of a safety case can be hierarchically abstracted. These
deﬁnitions, along with the formalization hicases, provide the
speciﬁcation for our implementation of hicases in AdvoCATE.
Finally, we illustrate our implementation of hicases in Advo-
CATE (Section IV) by hierarchising the running example.
II. RUNNING EXAMPLE
A. Basic Goal Structuring Notation
Fig. 1 shows part of an argument structure extracted from a
much larger safety case for the assurance of ﬂight transit oper-
ations involving a Ground-based Detect and Avoid (GBDAA)
capability [14]. The main claim (G7) for the fragment shown
concerns the acceptability of the GBDAA function to safely
avoid intruder air trafﬁc when an Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) is transiting through its operational airspace. In brief,
to provide assurance that this claim holds, the argument
presents a chain of reasoning (along with evidence) regarding
the procedural and technical implementations of the avoid-
ance function. The former further includes reasoning over
deconﬂiction and operator-speciﬁc procedures, whereas the
latter considers airworthiness and equipage issues. For a more
detailed description, refer to [14].
We have presented the safety case fragment of Fig. 1 using
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [2], a graphical notation
for representing the structure of an argument from its premises
to its conclusions. Note that this structure has no hierarchical
abstraction and we consider it to be a ﬂat safety argument. As
shown, the core elements of GSN each represent particular
types of information that can be conveyed through a safety
case. Speciﬁcally, we can state safety claims using goals and
sub-goals (rectangle), e.g., nodes G7 and G8; the strategies
to develop goals (parallelogram), e.g., nodes S1 and S5; the
evidence used to substantiate the claims (circle), e.g., nodes
E1 and E2; together with the appropriate associated context
(rounded rectangle) e.g., nodes C1 and C15; assumptions,
and justiﬁcations (ovals annotated with A and J respectively),
e.g., nodes A1, and J2. GSN also provides a graphical ‘◇’
annotation to indicate undeveloped (i.e., incomplete) elements,
e.g., node G11. There are two link types with which to
connect these notational elements: in context of () and
is supported by (). In addition to these core constructs,
GSN provides infrastructure for modular abstraction via the
notions of modules, contracts, and so-called away nodes,
which we do not consider in scope for this paper. Moreover,
GSN provides notational extensions for specifying argument
structure patterns that, likewise, are out of scope.
In general, a GSN argument structure is a tree, with a goal
as root, stating the safety objective to be demonstrated. It
can be useful to relax this condition, and consider partial
safety cases, i.e., argument structure fragments with a goal
as a local root (as is the case for Fig. 1), each of which will
be connected, eventually, to a unique global root goal. It is
worth noting that the GSN standard [2] is very ﬂexible, i.e.,
GSN elements are not subject to many syntactic restrictions
and have no (formal) semantics. We believe that well-designed
safety cases need such restrictions, and in this paper we will
utilise our deﬁnitions to restrict the types of safety cases that
can be constructed to those that are sensible.
B. Abstracting Structure with Hierarchy
Now we describe how hierarchical structuring can be intro-
duced into the ﬂat argument structure of Fig. 1. Speciﬁcally,
Fig. 2 shows the hierarchisation of one subtree of Fig. 1, while
in Fig. 3 we show how Fig. 1 can be completely hierarchised.
As shown in these ﬁgures, there are several ways in which
a safety case can be hierarchically structured, by introducing
hierarchical nodes (hinodes) of different types. Additionally,
each hierarchical node can have two possible views: it can
be open and the argument structure that it contains is visible
thereby allowing detailed inspection; or, it can be closed and
be viewed abstractly as a safety case node of the given type.
In general, we permit three types of hinodes:
(1) Hierarchical goals are an abstraction to hide a chain of
goals and one of their main purposes is to provide a high-
level view of an argument structure. Thus, in Fig. 1, we can
hierarchically abstract the entire subtree (with root at G8) into
the higoal HG2 (See Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).
(2) Hierarchical strategies either (i) abstract a goal reﬁne-
ment sequence that is considered as supplemental to the main
argument of interest, thus reducing the degree of branching in
the argument structure; or, (ii) aggregate a meaningful chain
of (one or more) related strategy applications.
For instance, in Fig. 1 the fragment of the argument bet-
ween, and including, strategy nodes S2 and S4 is a chain
of strategies that we can consider together as a higher-level
strategy. Thus, we can abstract that fragment as a hierarchical
strategy. Fig. 2 presents this hierarchical strategy in its open
view, where both the hinode and its content are visible (hinode
HS1). Fig. 3 shows HS1 in the closed view, acting as a
normal strategy node and reducing the size of the safety case.
Effectively, the closed view allows parts of a safety case to be
viewed at a more abstract level.
Of course, to guarantee assurance, the safety case must
still be reviewed in its entirety, but we believe hierarchical
abstraction enables both abstract content and concrete details
to be viewed as required.
(3) Hierarchical evidence abstracts a fully developed chain
of related strategy applications. In Fig. 1, since the fragment
starting from the strategy node S6 is downwards complete,
i.e., it has no undeveloped elements, we can construct a
hierarchical entity that abstracts and encapsulates it. In other
words, the subtree (with root at strategy node S6) that justiﬁes
goal G15 can be packaged as a hierarchical evidence node
(Hinode HE2 in Fig. 2, and Fig. 3).
C. Restrictions on Hierarchical Structuring
There are restrictions on that which can be abstracted inside
a hinode: ﬁrstly, to preserve well-formedness, we require that
input and output node types are consistent. Thus, a hierarchical
strategy would have a goal as an incoming node and goals as
outgoing nodes, in the same way as a normal strategy. Next,
we cannot abstract disconnected fragments as there would be
no path from the input goal to all the outputs. A design
decision was made to place any context, justiﬁcation, and
assumption nodes inside a hinode; thus, we may not link
a hinode to any other node using a  link type. Finally,
we permit containment of hinodes by other hinodes, which
allows us to nest hierarchies (see Fig. 2, where the higoal
HG2 contains the hinodes HS1 and HE2) as a way to manage
argument structure size. The combination of strict control over
entities that can be abstracted, and the ﬂexibility offered by
a partial order of hierarchy gives rise to intricate deﬁnitions
of the key operations on hicases. To mitigate against potential
ﬂaws in hierarchisation and views, we have proved that these
operations are correct. Note that the value addition that hinodes
provide, is mainly to the structure of the argument. Thus,
whereas a hicase communicates the same essential argument
as its ﬂat counterpart, we believe that the former may be,
intuitively, easier to understand during argument review. Fur-
thermore, the relevance of the formalization (described next)
to the higher assurance of a safety case is the conﬁdence that
can be placed in the well-formedness of a hicase constructed
from an automatic hierarchisation.
III. FORMALISATION
A. Preliminaries
First, we give a mathematical account of (ﬂat) safety cases
by representing them formally as a labelled tree, where the
labelling function distinguishes the types of nodes subject to
some intuitive well-formedness conditions. Let {s, g, e, a, j, c}
be the set of node types: strategy, goal, evidence, assumption,
justiﬁcation, and context respectively. The subset {s, g, e} are
core node types; and {a, j, c} are contextual nodes.
Deﬁnition 1 (Partial Safety Case). A partial safety case
(argument structure) is a triple ⟨N, l,→⟩, comprising nodes
N , the labelling function l ∶ N → {s, g, e, a, j, c}, and the
connector relation, →∶ ⟨N,N⟩, which is deﬁned on nodes. We
deﬁne the reﬂexive, transitive closure,→∗∶ ⟨N,N⟩, in the usual
way. We require the connector relation to form a ﬁnite forest
with the operation isroot→(r) checking if the node r is a root
in some tree. Furthermore, the following conditions must be
met:
(1) Each part of the partial safety case has a root goal:
isroot→(v) ⇒ l(v) = g
(2) Connectors only leave strategies or goals: v → w⇒ l(v) ∈
{s, g}
(3) Goals cannot connect to other goals: (v → w) ∧ (l(v) =
g) ⇒ l(w) ∈ {s, e, a, j, c}
(4) Strategies cannot connect to other strategies or evidence:
(v → w) ∧ (l(v) = s) ⇒ l(w) ∈ {g, a, j, c}
By virtue of forming a tree, we ensure that nodes cannot
connect to themselves, that there are no cycles and, ﬁnally,
that two nodes cannot connect to the same child node2.
For uniformity, Deﬁnition 1 does not make a distinction
between is supported by edges that connect core nodes, and in
context of edges that connect contextual nodes. We make this
distinction with a notational convention: We write v1 v2, if
2Arguments in some domains, such as security assurance, commonly exhibit
structures wherein multiple claims may be supported by the same evidence.
Though our tool does allow this, evidence assertions (i.e., claims that can be
made given the evidence provided) are unlikely to be exactly identical in a
strictly well-formed argument, when used in support of higher-level claims.
The theory described here uses this strict deﬁnition.
Fig. 2. Hierarchisation of a subtree of the argument structure of Fig. 1, with
all hinodes open. The remaining branches of the argument have been hidden.
v1 → v2 and l(v2) ∈ {a, j, c}. Contextual nodes play little part
in what follows, so we will write v1 → v2 to mean that l(v2) ∈
{s, g, e}. We say that an argument structure is a total safety
case when it has a unique root. We will also refer to partial
safety cases as ﬂat when we want to emphasize their non-
hierarchical nature. An important notion that can be deﬁned
on a safety case is that of being fully developed, as one way
to syntactically characterize its internal completeness.
Deﬁnition 2 (Fully Developed Safety Case). A total safety
case ⟨N, l,→⟩, is fully developed if for every goal g ∈ N ,
∃v ∈ N , such that g →∗ v with l(v) = e. That is, all goals lead
to evidence.
In fact, it is easily seen that this can be equivalently
rephrased to state that all paths (connecting core nodes) lead
to evidence. In other words, irrespective of node content, we
say that a total safety case is internally complete if it is fully
developed. Although there are many potential deﬁnitions of
completeness, Deﬁnition 2 is the one we will use subsequently,
in deﬁning hierarchy.
Note, also, that in Deﬁnition 1 we have excluded the concept
of an undeveloped node, and capture it by means of attributes.
Our tool AdvoCATE [7], for example, permits the following
attributes: (a) developed: whether the node is developed or
still to be developed; (b) identiﬁer: of the goal, strategy, etc.;
(c) description: of the goal, strategy, etc. In general, we allow
safety case nodes to contain arbitrary attributes, or metadata;
in turn, this allows us to deﬁne complex rules, e.g., for node
colouring. Attributes for nodes are accessed via projection
functions tbd , id , etc., e.g., the attribute value associated with
the undeveloped goal G9 in Fig. 1 is tbd(G9) = true.
Now, we extend Deﬁnition 1 to hierarchical safety cases (or
hicases for short). Hicases extend the deﬁnition of safety cases
with an additional relation to represent hierarchical structure.
We use the partial order symbol ≤ where n < n′ means that
the node n is inside n′. We wish to deﬁne hicases in such a
way that we can always unfold all the hierarchy to regain a
ﬂat safety case.
Deﬁnition 3 (Partial Hierarchical Safety Cases). A partial
hierarchical safety case is a tuple ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩. The set of
nodes N , labelling function l, and connector relation → are
as given in Deﬁnition 1. The forest ⟨N,→⟩ is subject to
all conditions except condition (1) of Deﬁnition 1.3 The
hierarchical relation is a (necessarily ﬁnite) forest qua poset
⟨N,≤⟩. Generalising condition (1), global roots must be goals:
isroot→,≤(v) ⇒ l(v) = g. Finally, we impose conditions on the
interaction between the two relations → and ≤:
(1) The connectors will target the outer nodes: (v → w1) ∧
(w1 < w2) ⇒ v < w2.
(2) Connectors come from inner nodes: (v → w2) ∧ (w1 ≤
v) ⇒ v = w1.
(3) Enclosure and connectors are mutually exclusive: (v ≤
w) ∧ (v →∗ w) ⇒ v = w.
(4) Two nodes which are both at the top level (or immediately
included in some node) means at most one has no incom-
ing → edge. That is: siblings<(v1, v2) ∧ isroot→(v1) ∧
isroot→(v2) ⇒ v1 = v2 where siblings≤ refers to sibling-
ness in the forest.
(5) If v is a local root (using →) of a higher-level node w
(i.e., v < w), then
3Since the root of a hinode will match the type of the node itself.
– l(w) = s, if l(v) = s ∧ [∀v′ v′′.(v′ < w ∧ v′ → v′′ ∧
v′′ ≮ w) ⇒ l(v′′) = g∨ subtree rooted at v is not fully
developed], or
– l(w) = e, if l(v) = s∨ l(v) = e∧[∄v′ v′′. (v′ < w∧v′′ ≮
w ∧ v′ → v′′)∧ subtree rooted at v is fully developed,
or
– l(w) = g, if l(v) = g ∧∀v′ v′′. (v′ < w ∧ v′ → v′′ ∧ v′′ ≮
w) ⇒ l(v′′) = s ∨ l(v′′) = e
Conditions (1) – (4) of Deﬁnition 3 are designed to produce
a mapping from a hierarchical safety case to its (ﬂat) safety
case unfolding, i.e., its skeleton, and they are identical to the
conditions on hierarchical proofs [11]. We show subsequently
(Section III-B), that safety cases can be viewed as (trivial)
hicases and that the skeleton operation unfolds into a ﬂat safety
case. The ﬁnal condition ensures that:
– A hierarchical strategy must have a strategy as root, and
either (a) any node immediately outside the hierarchical
strategy is a goal, or (b) the subtree with root v inside, is not
fully developed. The latter case catches the possibility that
there are no outgoing goals, but the node is not evidence.
– A hierarchical evidence node is the special case of a hierar-
chical strategy with no outgoing goals, but the subtree with
root v is fully developed. Degenerate hierarchical evidence
nodes are also allowed with the l(v) = e condition.
– A higoal must have a goal as root, and any nodes immedi-
ately outside must be strategy or evidence nodes.
– All other node types must be leaves of <.
Hicases also have attributes in the same manner as their
ﬂat counterparts; however, some of the attributes for hinodes
must be consistent with those of the nodes they enclose. For
example, a hinode is considered undeveloped if any of its
contained nodes is undeveloped.
B. Hicase Properties
In this section, we present and prove4 the hicase properties
that demonstrate that hicases are ﬁt for purpose. In particular,
we show (a) the mutual exclusivity of hinodes, demonstrating
that the choice of hierarchical node type is uniquely deter-
mined by the contents; (b) the skeleton operation that removes
hierarchical structure, leaving a well-formed ﬂat safety case;
(c) the precise conditions under which a hicase fragment can
be hierarchised, and the correctness of hierarchisation in the
technical sense that adding hierarchy preserves skeletons; and,
(d) a notion of view through the hierarchy, that formalises the
notion that a hinode can be either seen as a black-box node,
or have its contents exposed. Firstly, we establish that there is
no ambiguity about the type of a hierarchical node.
Theorem 1 (Mutual Exclusivity). Any hierarchical node—not
a leaf in the ≤ forest—can only satisfy the criteria for one of
the hierarchical strategy, evidence, or goal types.
Next, we relate safety cases and hicases: our main result
is that the hierarchy can be unfolded to produce a ﬂat safety
4Due to space constraints, we omit the proofs of mutual exclusivity and
correctness of the skeleton operation.
case. Conversely, we note that a safety case ⟨N, l,→⟩ can be
mapped to a hicase ⟨N, l,→, idN ⟩ where idN is the trivial
partial order with only reﬂexive pairs. This ordering trivially
satisﬁes all the well-formedness properties of a hicase.
To retrieve the original safety case from a hicase, we
deﬁne a skeleton operation, (sk), mapping hicases into ﬂat
safety cases and state that the tuple it constructs is indeed
well-formed with respect to the safety case conditions of
Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 4 (Skeleton Operation). The skeleton operation, sk,
is deﬁned to map a hierarchical safety case ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩ to a
safety case ⟨N ′, l′,→′⟩, where N ′ is the set of leaves of ≤, l′
is the restriction of the labelling function l, and v1 →′ v2 iff:
(1) v1 → v2, or (2) ∃ w. v1 → w and v2 is a local root of w.
Theorem 2 (Skeleton). If h is a hicase, then sk(h) is a
well-formed safety case. That is, it satisﬁes the properties in
Deﬁnition 1.
Now, we characterise the fragments of a hicase in which
it is possible to create a hinode. Thereafter, we describe the
hierarchisation operation that encloses the fragment in a hicase
with a new hinode. Finally, we state the correctness of this
operation, i.e., it preserves skeletons. As a ﬁrst step towards
this, we deﬁne a safety case fragment.
Deﬁnition 5 (Safety Case Fragment). Given a safety case
⟨N, l,→⟩ and a set F ⊆ N . A safety case fragment is a
tuple ⟨F, l↾F ,→↾F ⟩ such that ⟨F,→↾F ⟩ is closed under  and
→ ←, with root v where l↾F (v) ∈ {s, g, e}.
That is to say, a fragment is a connected subset of a safety
case. We write → ← to mean that if v1 → v2 → v3 and
v1, v3 ∈ F then v2 ∈ F . A fragment can simply be one node
(a strategy, goal, or evidence node); or, it may be the whole
safety case. A safety case fragment will also satisfy properties
(2) – (4) of Deﬁnition 1. If the root is a goal, it will be a
safety case, i.e., also satisfy property (1).
Fig. 2 shows an example of a safety case fragment enclosed
by a hierarchical evidence node (HE2). Now, we extend the
deﬁnition to the more general situation of hicases, by ensuring
all nodes inside a chosen hinode are also part of the fragment:
Deﬁnition 6 (Hicase Fragment). Given a hicase ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩,
a hicase fragment is a tuple ⟨F, l↾F ,→↾F ,≤↾F ⟩ such that the
following conditions hold:
(1) F ⊆ N and is closed under  and → ← as before.
(2) F is also closed under ≤ i.e., if w ∈ F and v ≤ w then
v ∈ F .
(3) For v, v′ ∈ F , if v → w and v′ ≤ w then w ∈ F , i.e., it is
closed under entering hierarchy.
If a hicase fragment satisﬁes an extra structural condition,
then it can be hierarchised and we say that the fragment
is hierarchisable. That is, it corresponds to the set of nodes
enclosed by a hinode.
Deﬁnition 7 (Hierarchisable Hicase Fragment). A hicase





s ∧ all leaves w are strategies or evidence:
l↾F (w) ∈ {s, e}, or
g ∧ all leaves w are goals or evidence:
l↾F (w) ∈ {g, e}, or
e
That is, if the hicase fragment has a strategy as root, for
example, then the leaves (in that fragment) must be either
strategies (producing the output goals of the hierarchical
strategy) or evidence (no outputs).
Deﬁnition 8 (Hierarchisation). Given a hierarchisable frag-
ment ⟨F, lF ,→F ,≤F ⟩ of a hierarchical safety case ⟨N, l,→,
≤⟩, let f ∈ F be the global root of the fragment; i.e., a root
of → and of ≤. Furthermore, let fp be the parent of f with
respect to ≤ (if one exists). We deﬁne the hierarchisation of
the fragment by a new node h as ⟨Nh, lh,→h,≤h⟩ where the
individual elements are deﬁned as follows:
(1) N ′ = N ∪ {h}
(2) ≤ is extended to ≤h where h < fp and v < h, for all v ∈ F .
(3) For deﬁning →h there are two possibilities:
(a) if there exists v ∈ N such that v → f then →f is the
modiﬁcation to → such that v → h instead;
(b) otherwise, →h=→.
(4) Finally, we extend l by deﬁning lh(h):
(a) if l(f) ∈ {g, e} then lh(h) = l(f);
(b) if l(f) = s and there is a leaf of → in the fragment
that is a strategy, then l(h) = s.
(c) if l(f) = s and all leaves are evidence nodes. Then we
need to check that there are no nodes connected to f
that are not in the fragment, i.e., if ∃v′ ∈ N such that
f → v′ but v′ ∉ F then l(h) = s; otherwise, l(h) = e.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of Hierarchisation). If ⟨F, lF ,→F ,
≤F ⟩ is a fragment of a hicase h1 = ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩, and h2 =
⟨Nh, lh,→h,≤h⟩ is the hierarchisation of a new hinode h onto
h1, then h2 is a well-formed hicase, and the hierarchisation is
skeleton-preserving, i.e., sk(h1) = sk(h2).
Proof. The proof requires showing each of the cases of the
deﬁnition hold; we just sketch some of the details, e.g., →h
forms a forest: if →h=→ this is trivial; if not, we note that
the modiﬁcation fp → h does not break the partial order
axioms. In particular, it cannot cause cycles since h did not
previously exist. To show condition (5) of Deﬁnition 3, we
need, in part, a case analysis on l(h). Then, the conditions
on a hierarchisable fragment allow us to show that this
property holds. To show that the skeletons match, note that
the modiﬁcation (1) in deﬁning →h is exactly the opposite of
the skeleton transformation (2) from Deﬁnition 4.
To understand the open/closed representation of hinodes in
a hicase, we introduce the notion of a view. A view can be
seen as a particular slice through the hierarchy: either choose
the hinode or its contents. We deﬁne a hicase view as follows:
Deﬁnition 9 (Hicase View). Given a hicase ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩. Let
N ′ ⊂ N such that N ′ is closed under ‘<’ incomparability, i.e.,
(1) v1, v2 ∈ N ′ ⇒ v1 ≮ v2 and v2 ≮ v1.
Fig. 3. A complete hierarchisation of the ﬂat argument structure of Fig. 1, showing containment as well as both open and closed hinodes.
(2) v1 ∈ N ′ and v2 ≮ v1 and v1 ≮ v2 ⇒ v2 ∈ N ′
Then deﬁne →′ as follows: For v1, v2 ∈ N ′, v1 →′ v2 iff:
(1) v1 → v2
(2) if ∃ w ∈ N. v1 → w and v2 is a local root of w; or,
(3) if ∃ w ∈ N. w → v2 and w < v1.
The tuple ⟨N ′, l↾N ′ ,→′⟩ is a hicase view.
It is easy to see that the skeleton is a special case of a hicase
view.
Theorem 4 (A Skeleton is a View). The skeleton ⟨Ns, ls,→s⟩
is also a view of a hicase ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩.
Proof. By deﬁnition Ns ⊆ N and the conditions on →s match
the ﬁrst two conditions for a view. For the ﬁnal condition,
which states if ∃ w ∈ N. w → v2 and w < v1, note that v1 ∈ Ns
is a leaf and therefore there is no such w.
More generally, any view forms a safety case.
Theorem 5 (A View is a Safety Case). A hicase view
⟨N ′, l↾N ′ ,→
′,↾N ′⟩ of a hicase ⟨N, l,→,≤⟩ satisﬁes the well-
formedness properties of a safety case.
Proof. Firstly, we need to show that →′ forms a ﬁnite forest.
In fact, it forms a tree. It is straightforward to show that it
is rooted by a goal, since the underlying hicase must also
be rooted by a goal (and the closure property ensures that it
is chosen). To show that connectors only leave strategies or
goals, we reason about the possible source of v1 →′ v2. Either
v1 → v2, in which case the property holds trivially; or, v1 → q
for some w which is again trivial; or, ﬁnally, w → v2 and
w < v1 for some w. In the ﬁnal case, note that w is a hinode
and therefore l(w) ∈ {s, g, e}. If it is a strategy or goal, we are
done. If it is evidence, we derive a contradiction because by
deﬁnition w ↛ v2 for any v2. Similarly for other cases.
IV. APPLICATION
Our implementation of hicases in AdvoCATE closely
matches the formalization described earlier (Section III). Fig. 3
shows the hierarchisation of the ﬂat argument structure of
Fig. 1. As shown, the higoal HG2 contains additional hinodes
(all in their closed view) besides those shown in Fig. 2. In
particular, HG2 contains the additional hinodes HS2 and HS3,
which were hidden in Fig. 2, besides HS1 and HE1. Whereas
the fragment supporting goal node G15 has been abstracted as
the hierarchical evidence node HE2, observe that the fragment
supporting goal node G18 is, rather, a hierarchical strategy
(HS3) owing to the ‘◇’ annotation on the supporting strategy
(node S10) indicating incompleteness (See Fig. 1). The higoal
HG1 contains a hierarchical evidence node HE1, both of which
have been presented in their open view.
The open and closed views in AdvoCATE, as shown in
Fig. 3, can be seen as modelled by the views formalised in
Deﬁnition 9. The only difference is that the open view in
AdvoCATE keeps the contents of the ‘opened’ hinode visible,
whereas the formal notion is designed so that a view is, itself, a
ﬂat safety argument, but with no notion of visibility. Addition-
ally, the ability to create hinodes in AdvoCATE is governed by
Deﬁnition 8. The beneﬁt of hierarchical abstraction on the size
of a safety case is immediately apparent in Fig. 3 where, after
hierarchisation and progressively closing the hinodes (i.e., also
closing the higoals HG1 and HG2), we can reduce the size of
Fig. 1, from 45 nodes, to only 6 nodes.
V. RELATED WORK
Hiproofs [11] are the immediate inspiration for hicases, and
we follow the hiproof notation for the graphical representation
of hicases. Hiproofs could be viewed as a more general model
(for hierarchical trees) than safety cases, without the particular
node typing present in hicases. An alternative understanding
would be to consider a hiproof as the strategy/evidence subset
of our hicase representation (where the ﬂow of goals is
represented by the connections). However, hicases go beyond
hiproofs by distinguishing multiple node types and requiring
a more complex condition on hierarchy. Although there are
several theorem provers and proof assistants which support hi-
erarchical proof to varying degrees, the speciﬁc data structures
they use have details which are not central to an understanding
of hierarchy [11].
The GSN safety case notation has a concept of module.
Modularity allows safety cases, as with other artifacts, to be
decomposed into discrete modules so as to contain change
impact, support distributed development, etc. Hierarchy, on
the other hand, permits a system to contain sub-systems
of the same kind. The concepts are thus distinct, though
complementary; if modules can themselves contain modules,
this results in hierarchical modularity [15]. However, there are
important differences between modularity and hierarchy for
safety cases.
Whereas away objects [2] are simply references to argument
fragments in another module, a hinode is an additional node
enclosing an already existing argument structure in the current
argument. Moreover, hinodes and modules encompass differ-
ent fragments. For example, a GSN module cannot correspond
to a hierarchical strategy, i.e., a fragment beginning with a
strategy, as an enclosure of an arbitrarily complex (unﬁnished)
safety case fragment. Similarly, a module can contain multiple
argument fragments (resulting in multiple roots), while a
hinode always encloses a fragment with a single root. Modules
also have informal contracts that they must fulﬁll to be
well-formed, but hinodes do not enforce any such semantic
constaints between nodes. Furthermore, while there is a formal
basis for hierarchy (now), GSN modules do not (yet) have
a formal basis. Thus, we can exactly distinguish between
hierarchisable and non-hierarchisable fragments, whereas the
constraints on modularizing safety cases are less clear. We plan
to place GSN modules on a formal footing, and investigate
more fully the relationship with hierarchy.
Safety case hierarchy using a notion of argument structure
depth has been previously proposed [16], and represented as a
basic decomposition. Although this approach can create the
equivalent of hierarchical evidence, it cannot hierarchically
abstract strategies, as in our approach, where we consider node
combination for meaningful abstraction.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper advances our previous work [12], [13] on hi-
erarchical structuring, by more precisely clarifying hierarchi-
cal safety cases and their properties. In particular, we have
formally deﬁned a skeleton operation as the unfolding of a
hicase into a ﬂat safety case, the notion of hicase view, the
conditions for hierarchisation, and proved the correctness of
these operations.
There are many interesting avenues for future development
of hierarchy in safety cases. However, since our current theory
only accounts for the core GSN, one key task is to extend the
notion of hierarchy to also account for patterns and modules.
Secondly, we would like learn potential hierarchical structure,
e.g., using metadata, after which one might be able to abstract
hierarchical patterns from existing safety cases.
We believe that both a formal basis and tool support are
crucial for improving the credibility and wider acceptance of
structured safety arguments during the certiﬁcation of safety-
critical products. Our goal has been to provide an abstract
speciﬁcation of hierarchy for safety cases, and a corresponding
implementation. The theory provides a formal foundation to
the implementation of hicases in our toolset, AdvoCATE [7],
providing features for constructing, modifying, and viewing
hinodes. To the best of our knowledge, this work describes
the ﬁrst implementation of hierarchy for safety cases.
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